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EARLY PRIZE COURT PROCEDURE
FRANcIs DEAK I AND PHILIP C. JESSUP $
PART Two
Evaluation of Evidence and the Use of Presumptions
From the point of view of the neutral claimant, there were in general
no difficulties when the ship's papers were complete, free from suspicion
and confirmed by the answers to the interrogatories. In such a case the
ship was not only released,74 but costs and damages were assessed against
the captor. It would indeed be a case in which the original capture was
without "probable cause".7'
As a matter of fact, however, it seems that not many ships were fully
equipped with all the requisite papers.7 6  On the other hand, the widespread
"doctoring" of papers by neutral merchants made the admiralty judges
somewhat cautious in accepting the ship's papers at their face-value. Pre-
sumptions were widely resorted to and the need for their rebuttal-so far
as they were rebuttable-made the claimant's case increasingly more diffi-
cult to sustain.
While classifications are always arbitrary, they may serve a purpose
in the presentation of a complicated problem. It seems that a classification
of the types of presumptions applied by prize courts may be useful in point-
ing out differences in purpose as well as in effect.
In general, it may be said that two types of presumptions are found
in early prize court procedure; these two types may conveniently be denom-
inated "statutory" and "judicial" presumptions.
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"' Thus, Dr. Exton suggested in i665 to the Lord Commissioners of Prizes the release of
two Italian (neutral) ships, the Emperor Constantine and the Ascension, captured by the
British during the second Anglo-Dutch war, on the ground that they both were "free ships
trading from free port to free port with free goods and likewise to and for the account of
free persons by the proofs in preparatori as either by the Bills of Lading or allegations ap-
pear, against which proofs nothing is either judicially alleged or proved". BRIT. REc. OFF.,
moss. H. C. A., Misc. 483.
'" "Every ship indeed, may, in time of war, be brought to and examined; but she is not
to be seized and captured, without the captors have just grounds to think she is the property
of an enemy, and not the property of subjects of a nation in peace and friendship, or neu-
trality. If such seizure and capture are made without just grounds, the party injured is en-
titled to have an action for damages . . ." The Resolution, supra note 28, at 21.
"I At times belligerent requirements regarding papers to be carried were too extreme to
make compliance possible. See Deik and Jessup, supra note 5, at 491.
(8i8)
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I. Statutory Presumptions
By statutory presumptions are meant those set up by legislative or
executive authority. In England, Acts of Parliament were passed from
time to time laying down the broad bases for prize procedure. 77  These stat-
utory provisions did not regulate the weight to be given to evidence nor
other minutiae of the procedure after it reached the actual trial of the case.
These details were left to Orders in Council.
78
In France and Spain there was no such sharp separation of powers
and all these matters were usually contained both in the royal Marine Ordi-
nances and in the regulations issued by the king in Council. 9 In each coun-
try, however, the prize regulations bound the judge, leaving him no latitude
unless the regulation itself or a subsequent modification from the same
source, gave him a measure of discretion.
A very usual provision of the type under consideration was that con-
tained in the English Prize Rules of February 22, 1664, article 4 of which
reads:
"That where any ship met withall by any of the King's royal navy,
or other ship commissioned by his authority, shall fight or make re-
sistance, or the said master or any of the company shall throw, burn,
tear, or conceal any of the ship's papers or documents, or shall have
no papers at all found on board in the said ship, or shall bring and
offer to the Court any false writings for evidence, thereby to clear her
or her goods, or any of them, the said ship and goods shall be judged
and condemned as good and lawful prize." "
The various acts here referred to may be considered separately.
(A) Resisting Visit and Search
"Resistance" was at times coupled with or taken to include "flight".
This prize rule was designed to provide an effective sanction for the exer-
cise of the belligerent right of visit and search at sea. The underlying
theory was that a bona fide neutral ship with neutral cargo on an innocent
voyage had nothing to fear from visit and search. Accordingly, if she fled
See supra note 53.
Cf. 17 GEo. II, c. 34, § 24 (1744) : "Provided always, That nothing in this Act con-
tained shall be construed to restrain his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, from giving such
further Rules and Directions to his respective Courts of Admiralty for the Adjudication and
Condemnation of Prizes, as by his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, with the Advice of
his or their Privy Council, should be thought necessary or proper"'
By the time of the World War at least, the British Crown did not have the power
to bind the prize courts by prerogative orders in council although the courts were still bound
by acts of Parliament and orders issued by authority thereof. Cf. The Zamora, [I916] 2 A.
C. 77.
'9 In both these countries, the earlier difficulties arose merely from the conflict between
provincial and central or royal authority.
- PRATT, op. cit. supra note 45, at 250.
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or resisted, it might be presumed that she had something to conceal. As
a matter of fact, the conduct of visiting belligerent vessels, especially pri-
vateers, and even proceedings in prize courts, were not so uniformly char-
acterized by respect for law as to inspire neutral merchantmen with confi-
dence. Flight or resistance, though not justified in law, was frequently
deemed preferable to a submission which might well result in pillage or
condemnation even though the venture were wholly innocent. The rule
referred to in the extract from the regulations of 1664 is found again in
article 3 of the Rules of June 3, 1672,11 but it is not mentioned in the Re-
port of 1753.
Similar provisions can be found in the French Marine Ordinances.
The Ordinance of February, 1543, does not mention resistance or flight at
all; while the absence as well as the destruction of papers are lumped
together as acts to be visited with the penalty of condemnation. 2  On the
other hand, flight and resistance to visit are treated separately from absence
or destruction of papers in the Ordinances of 1584, (article 65), and i68i
(Titre des prises, art. 12). The Swedish Ordinance of I7M5 flatly lays
down the rule that the penalty for resistance is condemnation.83
Although apparently conceived in terms of a conclusive presumption,
these provisions were in effect merely a penalty for an illegal act. In
other words, the fact of resistance or flight was an independent ground
for condemnation as a matter of substantive law. Nevertheless, it deserves
inclusion here because its application had the effect of altering the usual
procedural rules.84
(B) Destruction or Concealment of Papers
The British attitude toward destruction or concealment of papers was
thus formulated by Sir Robert Wiseman:
"The throwing away of paper is such an indication that they
were material to the concerns of the ship and lading, that the proof
'Id. at 252. In 1783, the Court of King's Bench (Lord Mansfield being temporarily
absent) held that neutral resistance to visit and search was lawful and no ground for con-
denmnation. Saloucci v. Johnson, reported in PAaK, MARINE INSURANCE (3d ed. 1796) 79,
363. The case arose on an insurance policy and it is notable that the Spanish prize court
on appeal in this case had affirmed condemnation on the basis of the resistance. This was in
accord with the rule laid down in art. 6 of the Spanish Ordinance of 1779, HENNINGS, op.
cit. Supra note 13, at 302. But the King's Bench decision was seized upon by the Danish
writer Schlegel to support his attack upon the contrary view of Sir William Scott in The
Maria (Paulsen), I C. Rob. 340 (1799). See SCHLEGEL, UPON THE VisrrATioN OF NEUTRAL
VESSELS UNDER CONVOY (1801) i8o.
' See art. 43, 12 ISA.mBERT, op. cit. supra note ii, at 854, 864-65. Absence and destruction
of papers is treated the same way in the Ordinance of March, 1584, art. 70, 14id. at 556, 58o;
while the Ordinance of August, 1681, penalizes only the absence of papers, Titre des prises,
art. 6, 19 id. 282, 334, without mentioning the destruction of papers.
' ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 167, 168, arts. 4 and 5.
'1 Condemnation on the ground of resistance or flight was also provided for in some
treaties, see, e. g., the treaties of France with the Hanseatic Cities of September 28, 1716,
art. 19, I LEBEAU, op. cit. sapra note 23, at 377, 379; and with Hamburg of April I, 1769,
art. 20, id. at 681, 683.
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of the contrary will be hardly admitted, for cui bono was the throwing
them away, if 'it were not to save the ship or goods, and missive letters
are many times great evidences of the condition both of ships and
lading. ,, . "s5
The same reasoning would apply to the destruction of papers and indeed
Sir Robert cites in support of his position article 40 of the Spanish Ordi-
nance of 1624 which provided that, "Papers thrown overboard, or torn, or
no papers found aboard, shall confiscate the goods, until it appear that the
said documents have been lost by mischance without their fault." Il
It has been noted that the English prize regulations of 1664 and 1672,
above-quoted, joined the concealment or destruction of papers with resist-
ance and flight. By the terms of the regulations they both would seem to
be bases for conclusive presumptions. But while with respect to acts of
resistance no indication has been found that any relaxation of the con-
clusiveness of the presumption was ever practiced, this is not so with
respect to concealment or destruction. On the contrary, while in terms
these facts raise a statutory presumption, the judges are apparently given
some latitude to construe their effect judicially in the light of the circum-
stances of each case, thus making the presumption rebuttable,-although
according to the above-quoted Position of Wiseman, such rebuttal might
be exceedingly difficult.
In 1673 the ship Bounder was condemned on the ground, inter alia, of
the steersman's sworn testimony that he threw papers overboard at the
time of the capture, although no other witness so deposed and the skipper
testified that no papers were destroyed. When this case was appealed, the
Lords laid down the proposition that if papers are destroyed or thrown
overboard, that "shall be sufficient grounds whereupon to pronounce sen-
tence".
8 7
During the Anglo-Spanish war in 1744, the Hamburg (neutral) ship
Franciscus was captured by the British. It appeared from the preparatory
examination that her destination might have been Dunkirk, which aroused
a "suspicion", according to Penrice, admiralty judge, "very well founded
by the concealment of the papers under a cask of wine and in the buoy of
the anchor," which were ultimately found by the captor.8"
According to the Report of 1753, the presumption arising from con-
cealed or destroyed (as also from missing or defective) papers was con-
clusive only upon the neutral's claim to costs and damages, provided other
evidence induced the court to decree restitution.
PosmioNs of Sir Robt. Wiseman, May 23, 1672, PRATT, op. cit. supra note 45, at 254.
Ibid.
6 Gillies v. The Owners of the Bounder (1673), 14 MoalsoN, op. cit. supra note I8, at
11907.
82 MARSDEN, oA cit. supra note 24, at 308, 310.
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The French ordinances contained in peremptory terms provisions call-
ing for the condemnation of any ship whose papers were thrown into the
sea. Such a provision is found as early as in the Ordinance of February,
1543,11 and was reiterated in most of the subsequent prize regulations. °
According to the Ordinance of September 5, 17o8, the rule was to be con-
strued strictly and the destruction of any papers was to be conclusive.",
There are instances, however, when the court was authorized to apply the
rule in the light of the circumstances of each case. Thus, in a letter to the
Count de Toulouse, admiral of France, dated February 2, 1710, the king
interpreted the provision to mean that the penalty of condemnation need
not necessarily attend the destruction of every kind of paper, but only of
those documents which were important for the determination of the char-
acter of ship and cargo.92  At another time the king expressed the wish to
the admiral that the rule should be applied by the prize judges in its full
rigor or modified "selon les circonstances particuli~res"9 3  That the courts
did not fail to avail themselves of the latitude thus permitted by the king is
illustrated by the case of the Swedish ship La Fortune in 1779. The captor
alleged that the master of the captured vessel threw the ship's papers in
the sea. The procureur gneral urged condemnation chiefly on this
ground,9 4 but the ship was released by judgment of December 27, 1779.95
While the evidence as to the destruction of papers in this case was not con-
clusive, the leniency authorized by the king and made use of by the court
suggest the underlying motive of a desire to cultivate neutral good will.
96
'Art. 43, 12 ISAMBERT, op. cit. supra note II, at 854, 866; i LxBEAXU, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 9, 18, "Et oii ne seroit trouuie chartre et partie dedans lesdits nauires prins, ou que le
maistre ou compagnons l'eussent jett6 en la mer, pour en celer la veriti: voulons que lesdits
nauires ainsi prins auec les biens et marchandises estans dedans, soient declarez de bonne
prinse."
' See, e. g., the Ordinance of March, 1584, art. 70, 14 ISAMBERT, op. Cit. supra note II,
at 556, 58o; I LEmBAu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 19, 26-27; Ordinance of September 5, 1708,
i id. at 334; Rtgleinent of October 21, 1744, art. 6, id. at 471, 474; and of July 26, 1778, art.
3, 2 id. at 58, 59. It is acknowledged also in the French jurists' Mt1noire of 1753, SATOW,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 346 . It may be noted that destruction of papers as ground of con-
demnation was agreed upon in several treaties, see, e. g., the treaties of France with the Han-
seatic Cities of September 28, 1716, art. 17, I LEBaP.u, op. cit. supra note 23, at 377, 379; with
Hamburg of April I, 1769, art. 18, id. at 681, 683.
91 I LmEBAu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 334. Condemnation was to be pronounced, "sans
qu'il soit besoin d'examiner quels 6toient ces papiers, par qui ils ont 6t6 jet~s, ni s'il en reste
suffisamment ;! bord pour justifier que le vaisseau et son chargement appartiennent A des amis
ou allies". This provision was also in the Ordinance of July 26, 1778, 2 id. at 58, art. 3.
2 id. at 347.
ARCH. NAT., Fonds de la Marine, mss. F2-77; 2 LmaBu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 161;
letter of the king to the admiral, November 13, 1779.
"ARCH. NAT., Fonds de la Marine, mss. F2-I, 2me p. doss.; also 2 PIsToYE AND Du-
vaunY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 73.
W2 LmzEu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 169; 2 PisToYE AND DUVmnY, op. cit. supra; note
6, at 73. For an interpretation of the rule condemning a ship for the destruction of papers
and for a construction of the French ordinances see the opinion of Mr. Gore in the case of
The Diana before the Anglo-American Mixed Commission under Article 7 of the Jay treaty
(1794), 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 336-38.
IIt may be noted that both the king's letter to the admiral and the judgment of release
rendered shortly thereafter, coincide with the period when the negotiations leading up to the
first Armed Neutrality were in full progress. Sweden, together with the other Northern
Powers, had taken a prominent place in asserting the rights o f neutral nations.
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(C) Absence of Papers
The absence of papers is joined with resistance and destruction or
concealment of papers in the above-quoted English Prize Rules of 16 64 .'
The presumption raised on this ground is statutory and again would seem
at first impression to be conclusive. Taking into consideration the various
requirements of the belligerents at any given time, as to the number and
kind of papers a neutral ship was expected to carry, the conclusion is
inevitable that this presumption was subject to a large degree of judicial
construction. This presumption, together with the presumption arising
from defective ship's papers, although in its inception statutory, may be
said to be on the border-line between conclusive statutory presumptions
(illustrated by the rule as to resistance) and the rebuttable judicial pre-
sumptions to be discussed hereafter.
In case a ship was captured which carried no papers at all, condemna-
tion on this ground would seem inevitable. 98 Such cases, however, were
not common. The problem was presented rather by the absence of some
of the papers only; and the door was opened wide to judicial speculation
as to whether or not the absence of the missing paper should involve con-
demnation of the vessel by the application of the rule. This seems to have
been the situation in France where prize regulations usually specified the
papers, charter-party, bills of lading and invoices, the absence of which was
made a ground for condemnation. 9 Similarly, the Swedish Prize Regula-
tions of February I9, 1715, specified in article 16 the papers the absence
of which was a ground for condemnation.'0 °
In the case of the Notre Dame de la Conception, captured by the
French, vessel and cargo were released with the exception of part of the
cargo for which no papers were found on board. This part of the cargo
v Supra note 8o. So also in the Spanish Ordinance of 1624, the English Report of 1753
and the French Ordinance of 1543, all quoted above.
" Art. 8 of the Spanish Ordinance of 1718 stated flatly that the ship and its cargo would
be good prize if no papers were found on board at the time of the capture. ABREAu, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 29. This was also the rule in art. xvi of the Ordinance of 1779, unless the
papers were lost by inevitable accident. HENNINGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 304. But cf.
art. 40 of the Spanish Ordinance of i8ol, which provided that in the absence of papers, the
facts are to be ascertained by examining the master, and the captor, and by expert examina-
tion of the cargo. If the owner was not thus discovered, a year and a day was allowed for
a claimant to appear and prove his property. 3 NovisrMA REcoPMACi6N DE LAS LEMs DE
ESPARiA (1805) lib. vi, tit. 8, p. 129. Absence of papers was also recognized as a proper
ground for condemnation in the French jurists' Minwire of 1753. SATOW, op. cit. supra note
16, at 346.
t0 See: Ordinances of February, 1543, art. 43, 12 ISAmBERT, op. cit. supra note Ii, at 854,864;
March, 1854, art. 70, 14 id. at 556, 580; August, 1681, Titre des prises, art. 6, ig id. at 282,
334. As to the divergence of opinion whether the Ordinance of 1681 made the absence of all
papers a ground for condemnation or whether it was to be applied also if any one of the speci-
fied papers was missing, see DeAk and Jessup, supra note 5, at 507-508.
1c0 ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 167, 173.
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was condemned as good prize over the master's allegations that these goods
were laden on his account.10'
The Scotch practice seems to have treated the absence of papers as
raising merely a rebuttable statutory presumption. Thus, in the case of
The Debora, the absence of papers was held to be sufficient ground for
suspicion to justify the capture of the ship but the court permitted the
presumption to be overcome by the master's oath.10 2  Where the papers
were "lost by accident", Penrice permitted copies to be introduced in evi-
dence.103
It is clear that there were papers mentioned, in the prize rules and
ordinances, the absence of which did not eo ipso involve condemnation.
The absence of passes, provided for by numerous treaties from about the
middle of the seventeenth century for the purpose of avoiding the incon-
veniences attendant upon visit and search 104 was apparently not within
the purview of the rule so broadly and peremptorily stated in the British
and French prize regulations, at least not in the British practice.' 05  In the
middle of the seventeenth century Jenkins and Sir Robert Shoutwell re-
porting on the unjust detention by Spain of English ships at Ostend,
expressed the opinion that the absence of a passport in treaty form did not
justify condemnation, but merely put the claimant to further proof.10 6
I ARCH. NAT., Fmds de la Marine, mss. G5-214. Judgment of July 21, 1695. It does
not appear from the pleadings and the decision whether the condemnation was based on the
strict application of the rule of condemnation for the absence of papers and the consequent
exclusion of extrinsic evidence which the master perhaps could, but was not allowed to offer
under the principle of condemnation, "out of the ship's own mouth", or whether it was based
on the master's inability to support his allegations by proof.
'Donaldson v. The Master of the Debora (1673), 14 MoRIsoN, op. cit. supra note I,
at 11913.
I De Klein David (1748), PRATr, op. cit. supra note 45, at 170, 174, 176. As to the rea-
son for the "loss" in this case see Deik and Jessup, supra note 5, at 497. Cf. the Spanish
rule on lost papers, supra note 98.
Concerning the treaty passports see Dedk and Jessup, supra note 5, at 515-26.
' Sir Robert Wiseman stated in 1677 in his PosmoNs that "The want of passports and
certificates, if there be other writings in her, cannot prejudice the ship; . . . though pass-
ports that be after the forms prescribed in treaties be necessary to avoid search and bringing
up of ships, and so avoid great trouble and charge, yet the ships and lading may be pre-
served from confiscation without them, so they be furnished with other writings and proofs
that may demonstrate them to belong to friends." PRAr, op. cit. suprq note 45, at 254. Cf.
Jenkins to the Lords Commissioners of Prizes concerning the ship Stetin, February ii, 1666,
2 WYNNE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 731. See also Jenkins to the Committee for Grievances,
concerning the Ahasuerus, November IO, i668, where he expressed the opinion that absence of
pass will at most subject the vessel to detention, "but the Owners, if free, are not by the
Treaty, nor Can they by law be debarr'd to make out their Property by legal Proofs". Id.
at 718.
BRIT. Ruc. OFF., ross. S. P. 91240. In the case of the Danish ships The Palm Tree
and Patience, captured on account of defective passes, it was held in Scotland that the ab-
sence of passes "did not simply confiscate, but that it did put the burden of probation upon
the strangers to prove, by sufficient documents, or witnesses above exception, that the ship
and loading did belong to the King of Denmark's subject, the King's allies". These ships
were released although there was "sufficient presumptive probation to infer a contrivance;
yet such as admitted a contrary positive probation, that the ship and whole loading belonged
to free persons". The Palm Tree and Patience v. Capt. Acheson (1673), 14 MoISON, op.
cit. supra note 18, at 11894. Accord: Prince of East-Freesland v. Capt. Binning (1673), id.
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According to the draft of an answer to Danish complaints against the
condemnation of neutral Danish ships by a British prize court during the
Great Northern War, neutral ships touching enemy ports, if not provided
with passes in the form agreed upon in the treaty, might be examined. The
masters and owners in such a case were obliged to prove their property,
the "designes of their voyages, and that they carry no contraband goods,
nor go to any place prohibited by treaty". For want of such proof, suffi-
cient time being first allowed to the claimants, such ships and their cargo
might legally be condemned.10 7
II. Judicial Presumptions
A more complicated problem is presented by the second type of pre-
sumption, based upon specific or general circumstances. These presump-
tions do not originate directly in statute but are derived either from judicial
construction of prize regulations or from extrinsic facts introduced in
evidence by the captor or of which it may be said the court took judicial
notice. The practice of resorting to such presumptions was thus described
by the great Scottish jurist, Lord Stair, in 1667:
"The greatest difficulty in the matter of prizes, is, the discovery
and probation of the interest of the enemies. If probation be not had
from the oath of the skipper and company, or from the documents
found aboard, there remains no more but presumptive probation, which
sometimes is so pregnant as it admits no contrary positive probation,
and ofttimes it doth admit the same, and then there is probation
allowed to either party, for clearing the matter of fact, either as to
the property of ship or goods, the true residence of the master, or the
port truly intended, or any other matter of fact, whereupon confisca-
tion or liberation may be inferred." 1o8
This type of presumption which, for the sake of convenience, we call
"judicial" presumptions, differs from the "statutory" presumptions dis-
cussed above. Instead of arising from more or less precisely defined con-
at 11897; The King David v. Donaldson (1673), id. at 11go2. But in England the ship
Staden of Stockholm was condemned in 1711 "for want of a passport". PRATr, op. cit. supra
note 45, at 205.
X°*2 MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 148. The draft reply indicates clearly that con-
demnation "out of the ship's own mouth" was not an inflexible rule in English prize procedure
but the admission of extrinsic evidence was within the court's discretion: ". . . when a
ship, not being furnished with passes according to the treaty, is brought up and cleared by
other evidences than such as were found about the ship, the owners are obliged by law to pay
or bear all the costs and charges that accrue by reason of the bringing up and examination,
there being just cause to seize and examine the same; and where there is just cause of seizure,
the party that made the same is not lyable to any damages but such as shall happen through
his negligence or default." (Italics ours.) In other words, the absence of this type of ship
paper raised a rebuttable presumption justifying seizure and conclusive upon the neutral's
claim for costs but by no means causing condemnation ipso facto. See also citations supra
note 103.
3.0 I STAIR, op. cit. supra note 18, at 193.
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duct, it was left to the initiative and inclinations of the particular courts
or judges whether they would raise them-or, more precisely, whether or
not they would permit their being raised by the captor's allegations. If
admitted, such presumption would destroy the otherwise satisfactory evi-
dence of the claimant and put him at least to further proof in order to
sustain his claim for release. From this point of view, this "judicial" pre-
sumption was much harder on the claimant than the "statutory" presump-
tions, because he never knew when and from what circumstances such a
presumption might be raised against his evidence. On the other hand, these
were true presumptions in that they were, in principle at least, rebuttable,
while statutory presumptions were usually conclusive. As a matter of fact,
the claimant's position was not much better because actually it was often
impossible to satisfy the court by any evidence in rebuttal. To the extent
to which extrinsic evidence or external facts on which presumptions were
raised, were admitted, the burden of proof shifted to the claimant. Thus,
the use of presumptions placed an almost irresistible weapon in the hands
of the prize courts with which to annihilate the evidence offered by the
captured ship. The fact that courts did not always make unrestrained use
of this weapon, in no way detracts from its potential effectiveness which
was so overwhelmingly and-from the point of view of the neutral claimant
-so painfully illustrated by the prize decisions during the World War.
Presumptions of this type were raised on the ground of various facts
and circumstances. For the sake of convenience again, it seems that a sub-
classification of "judicial" presumptions may be advantageous for clarity
of discussion. Some presumptions were raised on the ground of facts
relating to the ship,-these may be called "intrinsic" (or "specific") pre-
sumptions. Presumptions raised on the basis of the captor's evidence or
of judicial notice of some known or believed facts or circumstances, apart
and wholly independent from the evidence obtained from the vessel, are
classified as "extrinsic" (or "general") presumptions.
(A) Intrinsic Presumptions
"Intrinsic" presumptions were raised on the basis of (i) defective
ship's papers; (2) fraudulent ship's papers; (3) contradiction between
testimony of those on board and the ship's papers; (4) the absence of
claims. These various situations may be considered separately.
(i) Defective Papers
Presumptions raised on the basis of defective ship's papers were on
the border-line between "statutory" and "intrinsic judicial" presump-
tions. To some extent, they were based on prize regulations and treaty
provisions which, in addition to specifying the documents a ship was re-
quired to carry, frequently prescribed both the form and content of these
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documents. 10 9 In this respect, defects in form or content gave rise to
statutory presumptions. But because the provisions specifying form or
content were not always detailed, a wide latitude was given to judicial
interpretation. The latitude existed with respect to the appreciation of the
effect of an alleged or proven defect-i. e., whether it was a material defect
to be visited by the penalty of condemnation or an inconsequential defect
which could be cured by other pertinent evidence. In case the defect was
found material, the court still had some latitude to construe the presumption
arising therefrom as a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption. The degree
of latitude in this respect was of course dependent on the attitude of the
particular jurisdiction toward the admission of extrinsic evidence."10
In discussing the effect of presumptions raised from the absence of
papers, it was pointed out above that under English practice this presump-
tion was not conclusive but rebuttable. In view of the discretion of
English prize courts to admit extrinsic evidence, it is obvious that the
rebuttal of presumptions raised from defective papers was eo ipso con-
ceivable.
The French, on the other hand, adhered much more rigidly to the
principle of determination of the ship's fate "out of her own mouth". It
may be asked, therefore, whether the presumptions raised on the basis of
defective ship's papers in French prize courts were conclusive or rebuttable.
The ship's paper around which the most controversy seems to have raged
was the bill of lading. The refusal to give evidential value to blank bills
of lading or "consignments to order" during the World War had many
precedents two or three centuries earlier. According to the French
Rdglements of February i7, 1694 (article 5) and October 21, 1744 (article
9), unsigned bills of lading were null and void."'
A brief on appeal by the French captors for the condemnation of the
Sainct Saveur, a Hamburg (neutral) ship captured in 1648, during the
Franco-Spanish war, argued, inter alia, that if the bill of lading does not
show clearly for whose account and risk the goods are carried, such "dis-
guise" or silence is an "infallible proof" (i. e., it is a conclusive presump-
tion) that they belong to the enemy. 1 .2  A few years later, in 1653, several
Hamburg and Lfibeck (neutral) ships were condemned as good prize on
account of defective bills of lading. The neutral owners appealed and the
' Concerning the requirement of the nature, form and content of ship's papers as con-
tained in national prize regulations and in international treaties, see Deik and Jessup, supra
note 5, at 50&-510, 515-526.
"" It should be clearly understood that by defective papers are meant here documents de-
fective in form or content but not fraudulent. The presentation of fraudulent papers in evi-
dence will be discussed below.
= i L BFaau, op. cit. supra note 23, at 188, i89; id. at 471, 475. So, too, under art. xvi of
the Spanish ordinance of 1779, HENNIMGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 3o4.
= Bmi. NAT., mss. F. 18592, p. 560.
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captor prayed for the affirmance of the judgment on the same ground.11
The motive behind the presumption raised on the basis of an incomplete
bill of lading was neatly expressed in the captor's reply to appellant's brief
as follows:
"Or un connoissement de cette qualit6, qui ne designe pas le
proprietaire, est inutil, comme s'il n'y en avoit point du tout pour ce
que le connoissement est requis par les Ordonnances afin de connoistre
si ]a marchandise est d'amis ou d'ennemis, si le connoissement ne la
dit pas, on presume avec raison que la marchandise est aux ennemis, sur
tout quand la navire va ou vient d'Espagne, pource que si elle estoit
aux alliez, ils ne manqueroient pas de faire escrire dans le connoisse-
ment comme ils font toujours." 114
However, the French did not inflexibly apply the presumption con-
clusively, as is shown by the case of the Dutch ship Le Smack. In this case
the weight to be given to defective papers and the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to cure the defects were argued at length by captor, claimant and
the government. The ship was captured in 1779 by the French during the
Franco-English war, while the Dutch were neutral. Bills of lading of the
cargo claimed by French and neutral merchants were defective in that some
of them merely stated that they were on "neutral account" without specify-
ing the consignee; others were not signed by the master. Relying on article
ii of the Riglement of July 26, 1778,115 the captors sought to exclude
copies of the bills of lading and other documents offered by the claimants
in support of their claim for release. The exclusion of this evidence was
sought on the ground, as summed up by the procureur grngra2 in his report,
that if evidence other than that found aboard is once admitted, "there will
be no cargo which cannot be saved" from condemnation.:"" The claimants
argued on their part that all documents offered by them were in conformity
with the papers found aboard; they bore the same mark, the same name of
consignee; and were, therefore, admissible."' The procureur ggniral, sur-
=Id. at 567 ff. "si les connoissemens ne disent pas en termes formels, pour le compte &
risque de qui la marchandise a est6 charg~e, se deguisement ou silence est une preuve infail-
lible qu'elle appartient aux ennemies, ." The ships were: La Fortune, S. Jacques,
Lours, L'Esperance, and The Gedeon.
I Ibid. Cf. also a memorandum prepared about 17oo, ARcH. NAT., Fonds de la Marine,
mss. G5-2i, in the form of a legal opinion, the anonymous writer stating: "il faut absolu-
ment declarer le nom de celuy pour compte de qui la marchandise est chargie autrement c'est
une fraude. En effet s'y cela estoit ainsi le mtre. d'un navire pouvoit prendre de la marchan-
dise dans son bord pour le compte d'un marchand qui est sujet d'un prince ennemi de 'Etat,
qui est confisquable. C'est la jurisprudence des Uz et coutumes de la mer de touttes les na-
tions de l'Europe et du l'ordonnance maritime du mois d'aout i68I."
2 Lm EAu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 58, 62 : ". . . les pi~ces qui pourroient 6tre rap-
port6es apr~s la prise des batimens, puissent faire aucune foi ni 8tre d'aucune utilit6, tant
aux propri~taires desdits bitimens qu'3 ceux des marchandise qui pourroient y avoir 6t6
charg~es; . .
" ARcH. NAT., Fonds de [a Marine, mss. F2-i, 2me p. doss.
1 Ibid. Admitting that, in principle, no contradictory extrinsic evidence is admissible,
the claimants argued as follows: "Mais il en est autrement, lorsque celles qu'on rapport depuis
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prisingly enough in view of the rigidity of the general run of earlier French
cases, suggested the release of both ship and cargo. He disposed of the
captor's argument that French and neutral merchants merely "coloured"
enemy goods-an argument based on the fact that the bills of lading did
not specify on whose account the goods were laden-by contending that,
.. . aucun R~glement n'a impos6 l'Obligation de mettre dans les
Connoissemens, les Noms, qualit~s, et demeures des Negociants pour
qui les Marchandises sont chargdes, il suffit que la consignation Neutre
soit constante, et la propri6t6 neutre jnoncge, . . . Les armateurs des
Corsaires preneurs accusent les R~clamateurs d'etre les prete-noms des
Anglois, et les Connoissements d'6tre simul6s, mais la fraude ne se
prisumne pas, et le Procureur G6n6ral ne voit A cet 6gard que des
assertions sans preuves." 118
(2) Fraudulent Papers
Another type of presumption which may be said to be on the border
line between "statutory" and "judicial" presumptions, was raised from
fraudulent papers introduced in evidence. The principle of fraus omnia
corrumpit is so universally accepted in every legal system and is so char-
acteristic of the administration of law that few of the prize regulations
contain an express provision relating to fraudulent evidence."1 9 It is
obvious, however, that whenever fraud was discovered, it was a sufficient
ground on which the credibility of the evidence was impeached and even
if the presumption were rebuttable, the party had a rather difficult task in
sustaining the burden of rebuttal. In another study by the writers the
fraudulent devices practiced by neutrals in order to evade barriers erected
by the belligerent against the freedom of neutral commerce have been de-
scribed.120  The widespread use of false papers by neutrals,-a use prompted
partly to escape the enforcement of legitimate belligerent interest, partly to
protect against the high-handed practices of the privateers-doubtless
justified to some extent the rigor with which prize courts sought to penalize
the use of fraudulent documents. On the other hand, the belligerent him-
self did not always come into court with "clean hands", so to speak, and a
la prise sont parfaitement d'accord avec celles trouv~es . Bord, et qu'elles s'6clairent mutuel-
lement." The extrinsic evidence here offered by claimants, "loin de contredire les pices de
Bord, elles ne font que les confirmer, et c'est se conformer aus dispositions du R~glement que
de n'avoir 6gard qu'aw pices de Bord, et a celles qui leurs sont parfaitement conformes
comme celles rapportdes".
n Ibid. This singularly benevolent attitude of the official of a French prize court to-
ward the neutral claimant is explained in a latter passage of the Procureur Gnral's conclu-
sions where he states that although it is necessary to encourage privateers, nevertheless "en
m~me tems La Navigation des Neutres ne pent Etre trop protegee d'apr~s les Ressources
qu'elle offre au Commerce National pendant la Guerre".
'1 See, e. g., the Danish Ordinance of September 23, 1659, art. 2, which provides that
false (as well as defective) papers "shall be considered of no value". ROBxxsON, op. cit.
supra note 2o, at 176, 182.
"' Deik and Jessup, supra note 5, at 510 ff.
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certain indulgence was, of necessity, shown toward the use of fraudulent
evidence. It was frequently the interest of the belligerent to have its own
trade carried on in neutral bottoms and, therefore, he had to close one eye
to such practices and the rebuttal of the presumption raised from fraudulent
papers was frequently permitted. The fraudulent devices were so manifold
that it is impossible to indicate them here in detail. It is sufficient to indi-
cate the most frequent devices-namely the "colouring" of enemy goods
(i. e., the carriage of goods of the belligerent under documents which pur-
ported to show neutral ownership)-and carrying a duplicate set of docu-
ments. This latter device was primarily used when the cargo consisted,
in whole or in part, of contraband. One set of the papers then showed
neutral destination in order to prevent capture since one neutral may carry
goods of a contraband nature to another neutral.
In 1627, during England's war with Spain, when neutral French mer-
chants used Calais as a port for unloading goods going to the Spanish
Netherlands, a British Order in Council declared that no credit should be
given to the ship's papers of "foreign states giving false certificates to
colour enemy goods". 121 The standing interrogatories used in England in
the I66o's included a question whether the witness knew that the Flandrian
claimants had in the past used their names to colour Dutch goods.122 The
preamble of the French Riglernent of July 23, 17o4, relative to neutral
commerce, emphasizes the necessity of preventing abuses committed by the
enemy "in collusion and intelligence" with neutrals. 23
During the first Anglo-Dutch war the St. Martin, a Danzig (neutral)
ship, allegedly bound for Dunkirk, was captured by the Dutch Baltic
squadron. The charter-party and other papers revealed, however, that she
was not to unload there but to proceed to London, "and this roundabout
way taken for fear of being molested by Dutch or German [sic]
privateers". 124  The Dutch (neutral) vessel Morningstar captured by the
British in 1657, produced bills of lading of a Dutch merchant to a merchant
at Amsterdam. When the Dutch ambassador protested against the capture,
he was informed that, "in the gunner's room, the right papers were found
hid, whereby it appeared that the others were coloured ones".' 25  The ship
Venus was condemned in Scotland because she carried a pass showing her
to be Swedish (neutral) property but a letter found aboard indicated that
she belonged to citizens of Lfibeck."ae
""Marsden, Early Prize .urisdiction and Prize-Law in England (191o) 25 ENG. HIsT.
REv. 243, 255.
BRIT. REc. OFF., rss. H. C. A. 427, question 3.
I LEBFAu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 283.
--'3 GARDINER AND ATICNSON, Lm'Tms AND PAPERs RELATING TO THE FIRST DUTCH
WAR, 1652-1654, p. 194, published by the Navy Record Society as vols. 13, 17, 30, 37, 41
(19o6-1915).
1- 6 THuRLoE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 36o. Nieupoort to Ruysch, June 29, 1657 (N. s.).
=Master of the Venus v. Capt. Wilson (1673), 14 MORISON, op. cit. supra note 18, at
11918.
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A few cases may illustrate that the use of fraudulent papers or the
carriage of double set of documents was to some extent condoned because
of belligerent interests involved.
In 1665, during the second Anglo-Dutch war, the Little Dorothy, a
Danish (neutral) ship laden with timber, allegedly Norwegian (neutral)
property, was captured by the British. The papers revealed neither the
ownership, nor the destination of the cargo. Jenkins, before whom the
case came for report, stated in advising release that,
"The Reason of this Blind, by the Owner's Confession, is, that
if this Fly-Boat had fallen into Dutch Hands, the Master might be at
Liberty to sell the Lading in their Ports, and that it might not be dis-
covered that they were bound for London.-" 12"'
The use of the double and false document by the Hamburg ship Live-Day
was found justified on appeal when it was proved that part of the cargo
belonged to a British subject.' 28  The Catharine of Rotterdam was con-
demned in the Scotch court on the ground, partly, that double documents
were found on board. On appeal, the claimants argued that everybody used
a duplicate set of papers and that, particularly in the case of allies, con-
demnation should not follow for this reason, since the double documents
were used to cover their trade from a common enemy, but the Lords
affirmed the decision below. 12 9 Similarly, when a Scotch ship was cap-
tured in 1705 by the French with duplicate papers, one showing Lisbon,
the other Havre as the destination, the claimant argued that the papers
showing Lisbon as the destination were carried solely to mask the ship and
the true destination was Havre.130 Had the vessel been captured by the
English or Dutch, then at war with France, the master could have argued
with equal force that the papers showing Havre as the port of destination
were intended solely to mask the ship in case of capture by the French.131
(3) Contradiction Between Testimony and Documentary Evidence
The presumption raised on the ground of contradiction between the
testimony of those on board and the papers found in the ship was rebuttable
= 2 WYNNE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 724.
' Master of the Live-Day v. Middleton (1673), 14 MoRIsoN, op. cit. supra note 18, at
'The Catharine of Rotterdam v. Capt. Gordon (705), id. at 11936.
I' Mitnoire for the master of the Bon Accord de Leith, ARC H. NAT., Fonds de la Marine,
mss. G5-214.
' See Sir Robert Wiseman's view that the practice of carrying double set of papers was
so usual as to be lawful and not to be a ground for condemnation. PRATT, op. cit. supra
note 45, at 255. For a different view see the letter of the King of France, dated March I,
1710, to the Count de Toulouse, admiral of France. I LEBrAu, op. cit supra note 23, at 348,
350. Cf. also the Swedish prize rules of February 19, 1715, art. 12, ROBINSON, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 171: "Tous les vaisseaux qui auront des documens doubles on contradictoires, en
sorte que selon quelques uns ils soient confiscable, & selon quelques autres libres, seront
n~anmoins declarez de bonne prise." Art. 17, id. at 174: "Les effets qui auront des documens
doubles ou contradictoires, seront confiscables comme les vaisseaux."
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according to the Report of 1753. 132 In the case of the ship Saint Ann,
Jenkins suggested that the claimants might be put to further proof on the
ground, inter alia, that the master denied the existence of a charter-party
although he made mention thereof in a letter to the owner. He said, how-
ever, that the Commissioners of Prizes had to decide whether this pre-
sumption "is sufficient to cast the onus probandi upon the vessel". 13 3 The
ship Bounder was condemned on the ground, inter alia, that the skipper's
testimony contradicted the passport and the Lords of Session held that, "if
the skipper, upon oath, contradict the pass as to the owners of the ship,
goods, . . . that they shall be sufficient grounds whereupon to pronounce
sentence". 13 4  In the case of The Crown of Dantzick, condemnation fol-
lowed when the testimony of the skipper and steersman contradicted the
papers indicating that the ship's port was Amsterdam and not Danzig,
"which the Lords found so pregnant evidences, that they would not admit
contrary probation".-35  In another case a decree condemning a Swedish
ship provided with Swedish pass was affirmed on the ground that the
"verity of the pass [was] cancelled by the testimonies of the skipper and
company". 13 6 The condemnation of the Danish (neutral) ship Le Lion du
Nord by a French prize court was sought by the captor chiefly on the
ground of alleged variance between the master's testimony and the ship's
papers. While there were minor defects in the papers, it seems that the
cargo was neutral property and that the destination was presumably inno-
cent. It appeared from the interrogatories that the vessel was laden in
Denmark in May but did not leave port until the end of September, con-
fessedly because of fear of the war. From this fact the captor sought to
draw the conclusion that the cgrgo was in truth for the account of the
English: "si les marchandises auoient appartenu v~ritablement a des Dan-
nois, il n'auoit eft rien a craindre de la guerre,"-a statement which ought to
have been but palpably was not true.'
3
7
The Notre Dame du Pilier was released by the French prize court on
September 2o;1692. The bills of lading showed the goods were loaded at
Lisbon, for a citizen of Portugal, but the answers of the officers to the
interrogatories showed that they were laden for the account of merchants
of Ostend or Holland. The king in Council reversed the sentence of re-
lease and condemned the vessel on October 26, 1692, because of this con-
' But the French Minoire treats it as a sufficient ground for condemnation. SATOW,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 346.
'November 9, 1665. BRIT. REC. OFF., ross. S. P. 9/240.
' Gillies v. The Bounder (1673), 14 MORISON, op: cit. supra note 18, at 119O7, 11911.
Accord: The St. Mary (1673), id. at 11915.
The Crown of Dantzick v. Capt. Lyon (1673), id. at 11892.
Burnmaster v. Capt. Dishington (I67I), id. at 11886. Cf. Loyson v. Laird of Ludqu-
harn (I669), id. at 1i88o, condemned, chiefly, on ground of contradiction and fraud in% evi-
dence.
'-" Circa 1705, AkcH. NAT., Fonds de la Marine, mss. G5-214.
EARLY PRIZE COURT PROCEDURE
flict of evidence, stating that bills of lading and other documents should not
prevail over the depositions of the officers and crew of the captured vessel,
since they alone "can bring the truth to light and uncover fraud". 1 38
It may be observed that at times the testimony of others than those on
board was received in evidence and was given weight to cast suspicion on
the captured vessel. In the case of the Swedish (neutral) ship, The Blue
Dove of Gottenbergh, Jenkins admitted sworn testimony that the Dutch
master of the vessel, who claimed to be domiciled in Sweden, had only a
"hired chamber" in Gottenbergh and thus he was not to be considered as a
bona fide resident of Sweden. This circumstance Jenkins held sufficient to
impeach the credibility of the testimony and raise a presumption against
the ship.'3 9
Lastly, it should be observed that prize courts took steps to ascertain
the veracity of testimony given by those on board the captured ship.
French prize regulations instructed the court to establish whether the wit-
ness, member of the crew, was conversant with the language of the country
whose national he claimed to be.140 The captor of the Swedish vessel Isle
de Hano sought condemnation on the ground that the master, claiming to
be a Swedish subject, was discovered at examination not to speak Swedish
and the interrogatories had to be administered to him in Dutch.
14 1
(4) Absence of Claim
The absence of any claim for release was another basis on which a
presumption as to the clandestine character of the unclaimed ship or cargo
was usually raised. During the Anglo-Spanish war in 1744, in the case
of the Hamburg (neutral) ship Franciscus, already referred to, while
further hearing on the admission of claims were reserved, "by the consent
of the parties on both sides", Penrice condemned part of the cargo,
"for which there were no claims as enemies' goods and liable to con-
fiscation for these reasons: Because . . . there being no claim, the
presumption was very strong that they were the effects of enemies, as
they came from an enemies' port." 142
In the case of the ship, The Emperor Constantine, one of the grounds on
which Jenkins supported his presumptions and objected to the release of
the prima facie neutral ship was that part of the cargo taken on in the
Spanish (enemy) port of Cadiz had not been claimed.'4 3
2 PISTOYE AND DuvERIY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 424.
M arch 17, 1665. BRIT. Ra. OFF., mss. S. P. 9/240.
71 See the Rgglement of July 22, 1676, I LEBEAu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 68, 70.
1705. ARcH. NAT., Fonzds de la Marine, mss. G5-214.71 Supra note 88. The goods condemned were taken on board at the Spanish ports of
Oratava and at the Canaries and were the produce of Spanish dominions. Accord: The
Marlborough (I74I), PRATr, op. cit. supra note 45, at 24, 32.
' Supra note 74; see also in 2 WYNNE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 700.
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(B) Extrinsic Presumnptions
Under this heading we propose to indicate the use of presumptions
raised from facts or circumstances wholly unconnected with the evidence
obtained "out of the ship's own mouth". As has been indicated above, the
use of such presumptions was particularly characteristic of British prize
procedure which was from early times liberal in admitting extrinsic evi-
dence from either party. The French and the Continental courts in general,
on the other hand, being much more rigid in this respect, resorted to such
presumptions less frequently, although their use was by no means excluded.
Extrinsic presumptions were raised from various facts and circum-
stances, so much so that they defy any attempt at classification. All that
is possible here is to indicate the more frequent types of the use of such
presumptions. The credibility of the evidence obtained from the ship was
called into question and enemy character (ownership or destination) of a
prima facie neutral ship or cargo was presumed on the ground that the
vessel changed its customary route and began to trade with ports which due
to their geographical location were particularly fitted for transshipment to
an enemy country-a foreshadowing of the later rules of continuous voyage
and ultimate destination; 144 that the ship was to unload in a port suspected
of clandestine trading with the enemy; '45 that the voyage of the neutral
ship was between enemy ports; 146 that the ship was captured in suspicious
"'During the second Anglo-Dutch war, Jenkins was suspicious of the Swedish ship,
The Blue Dove of Gottenbergh (see supra note i39), which, according to the papers, was
bound from Amsterdam whence she came in ballast from Lisbon to Gottenbergh. "That
which makes against this voyage," reported Jenkins, "is that all the voyages she ever made
have been from Gottenbergh to Amsterdam." He took notice of the fact that the Dutch
might use neutral bottoms to carry on trade which they could not carry under their own flag.
Similar considerations aroused Jenkins' suspicion concerning the Italian ship the Emperor
Constantine, Bar. Rac. OFF., mss. S. P. 9/240; 2 WYNNE, oP. cit. sUipra note 9, at 70o, cap-
tured on a voyage to Ostend during the second Anglo-Dutch war, although she had been ply-
ing previously in the Levant only.
"~ See Jenkins' report in the case of the Emperor Constantine, supra note 144. This
port "pretended for discharge" was "not used before the war to receive such consignation".
This Italian ship was laden at Venice, took on cargo at Leghorn and Cadiz, with Ostend as
destination. Although ship, cargo and destination were admittedly innocent (see Dr. Exner's
opinion, supra note 74) Jenkins was not satisfied with the evidence "out of the ship's own
mouth": ". . . yet there are presumptions for the King that do (as I humbly conceive)
subject this ship to a very severe excursion for beside 'tis sufficiently known upon whose
account there is so much trading of late to Ostend, this master whose course of trade lay all
of his lifetime in the Levant would not have come into our Seas without extraordinary high
freight, and such, Flandrians had not reason to give him, but the Hollanders had, in regard
they cannot safely trade to these ports (at leastwise) in their own bottoms." Ostend, located
in Flanders, during this period under Spanish dominion, seems to have been a favorite port
of destination because of the facility with which a ship, ostensibly bound thither, could con-
tinue her voyage to a Dutch, English or) French port as seemed best, or unload there and
have goods shipped over land to an enemy destination. Cf. the case of the St. Jacob of Ham-
burg in 667, BRIT. REC. OFF., mss. S. P. 9/24o, and of the Franciscus, supra note 88.
14 See Jenkins' report to the Commissioners of Prizes in the case of the Inclination of
Rochell, where he declined to give any weight at all to the ships papers: ". . the French
do take it amiss that I do require further proof than these ship's papers to make out the
property. For, my Lords, I heed not any ship's papers since this voyage is from one French
Port to another." BMRT. REc. OFF., mss. S. P. 9/24o. The presumption of hostile character
raised from a voyage between two enemy ports was apparently not rebuttable by contrary
evidence in the ship's papers.
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company; 147 on the ground of evidence from other ships; 14s on the ground
of blacklists, prepared by the belligerent, of neutral merchants known or
suspected of clandestine trading on account of the enemy. 4 9 It may be
observed that presumptions raised from blacklists are in their nature
different from presumptions raised from other extrinsic facts in that these
blacklists are purposely prepared by the belligerent in order to control more
effectively neutral trade. It should also be noted that the blacklists initiated
by the British and used extensively by the Allied Powers during the World
War were by no means a novelty and were certainly not introduced in order
to meet "changed conditions".
The use of presumptions raised on such extrinsic facts was naturally
exceedingly harsh on the neutral claimant because a presumption always
weighed against the claimant and never against the captor. The effect of
presumptions on the burden of proof was concisely summed up by Jenkins
in his report concerning the ship The Emperor Constantine. It will be
remembered that the ship was prima facie innocent as to ownership, cargo
and destination, but Jenkins had doubts as to the credibility of the evidence
"out of the ship's own mouth" by reason of presumptions which he based
on various extrinsic matters. He wrote:
"Yet I must confess, that all of this which I have offer'd amounts
to no more than Matter of Presumption against these Ships, Here are
no Proofs in the Case, But I must crave leave to observe unto your
M. two things which I humbly conceive to be undeniable. The one, in
point of law, that where proofs are difficult, such presumptions as are
just and weighty shall so affect the Party presumed against as to be
reputed Proof against him until he do take them off, and evince the
contrary by legal and conclusive Proof. ... " 150
"I See the Emperor Constantine and the Ascension, supra notes 74, 144, 145, where one
of the grounds of Jenkins' objection against release was that these ships were captured in
the company of other vessels which had been condemned as good prize.
'a In the case of the Saint Ann, supra note 133, further proof was required from the
claimants on the ground, inter alia, that goods were consigned, according to the bills of lad-
ing, to some merchants to whom goods were consigned also in two Italian ships lately before
the court and, apparently, condemned. In the case of the Notre Dame des Carmes, a Genoese
(neutral) ship, captured by the French in 17o, during the war with Portugal, the captors
sought and obtained condemnation on the basis of evidence found in another captured ship, the
Dragon Volant. When claimant appealed, the captor sought to sustain the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence on the ground that they desired to prove thereby that the persons putting
cargo on board at Lisbon, although claiming to be Genoese, were in reality Portuguese sub-
jects. ARCH. NAT., Fonds de [a Marine, mss. G5-214.
I See the case o~f the Hamburg'ship, the St. Jacob, Barr. REc. OFF., miss. S. P. 9/24o.
April 26, 1667. It appears that Jenkins, when the case came before him, could rely on a
"private list" of such "Hamburgers as do business for Hollanders or are in partnership with
them". The ship had a cargo of French wines upon the account of one Wredes, a native of
Bremen who thus might freely trade with Hamburg merchants. But, observed Jenkins, "he
is certainly one that colours Dutch Goads, and often lends a species equivocating attestation
to his friends". As to the manner how this "private list" was obtained, see Jenkins' letter to
the Earl of Arlington, dated May iS, 1672, 2 WYXNE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 738-39.
1 Supra note 144.
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That the same point of view prevailed in France, appears from a circular
letter of Marillac, dated August 18, 1703, in which the admiral of France
exhorted the admiralty officers to take into consideration in proceeding
against captured ships that, "en matiere de prises la presomption doit estre
toujours contre le Reclamateurs". 151 The reason why the presumptions
should always weigh against the claimant was explained by M. de Marillac
on the ground that they take all precautions in obtaining ship's papers which
will conceal the true owner of ship and cargo; that they do not hesitate to
forge proofs and to invoke the support of their ambassadors, whereas the
captor "hardly ever" can supply evidence other than that found aboard, and
are, therefore, at a great disadvantage against the claimants. Apparently,
the French captors were not assisted by the ingenuity of a Sir Lionel Jenkins.
Conclusions
These procedural aspects of prize law are particularly interesting be-
cause, more than anything else, they indicate the extent to which the inter-
national law of belligerent and neutral rights had taken firm root as early
as the seventeenth century. One of the most usual criticisms of inter-
national law is that it lacks judicial machinery for its application and en-
forcement. Here is an ancient body of law constantly applied by courts.
The courts were indeed national in origin and organization, but they lived
up fairly well to the tradition that they applied international law. As noted
at the beginning of this article, that would be an empty boast if the adjective
law were wholly national. But this was not the case. The principles of
prize court procedure were evidently considered in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to be governed by international rules just as the sub-
stantive law was so governed. Of course, the law was frequently violated,
but the violations, in eliciting neutral protests, probably strengthened, as
much as they weakened, the legal rules. Naturally, there were differences
between the practices of the several states. So far as these differences
existed in details only, they were not the object of protest. When they
reached the point of a change in general principles, protests were immediate
and vehement. As has been the case in respect to many substantive rules
of prize law, England has constantly followed practices which have not been
accepted by other states.
The English courts have a splendid tradition, but the foregoing pages
have shown that the neutral claimant was not always safe in their hands;
he was, of course, often equally unsafe in the prize courts of other countries,
and, it may be added, he was often equally safe. As in other courts of law,
as much depends upon the character of the judge as upon the character of
I BIBL. NAT., mss. Fr. 16732, p. 206. The letter was sent on account of the release of
several ships which apparently was disapproved by higher authorities and caused them to issue
a warning for the strict observance of prize regulations.
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the law to be administered. A Scott or a Story or a Portalis could be de-
pended upon to administer fairly even a very defective body of law. The
wide use of presumptions in the seventeenth and eighteenth as in the
twentieth century, made possible a disregard of neutral rights and com-
pelled the claimant to rely chiefly on the fairmindedness of the judge; un-
fortunately, there were not enough great prize judges to go around in all
countries in all centuries. The neutral merchants have been far from blame-
less although the sins of the fraudulent must often have been visited upon
the innocent. It should be clear that human ingenuity in evading the law
did not begin with the twentieth century. Prize law and prize procedure
have their defects but the defects are not due to the existence during the
formative period of any fundamentally different traits of human nature or
economic necessities and desires.
The above study is of course fragmentary. If more material were
available on the practice of the prize courts in Denmark, the Netherlands,
Spain, and other countries, one might with more confidence generalize and
draw conclusions. Possibly the fragments gathered here are sufficient to
portray the legal structure without serious inaccuracy.
